The development of a methodology for defining safety criteria for CO 2 geological storage, realised under the ongoing CRISCO2 project, is depicted in this paper. Generic lists of eleven risk events and nine types of targets are proposed to serve an expert panel for identifying risk scenarios. Assessing the effects of risk events and comparing targets exposure to critical thresholds should lead to setting safety requirements. We focus on simple modelling, such as abacuses, analytical or semi-analytical models. An uncertainty management framework completes this methodology. Further work will concentrate on effectively deducing safety criteria.
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Introduction
CO 2 capture and storage (CCS) is now widely acknowledged as a credible measure within a portfolio to tackle greenhouse gas emissions and mitigate climate change. Its large-scale implementation requires demonstrating safety. Like other industrial activities, it cannot be adopted without guarantees about its harmlessness to humans and to the environment. However, whereas CO 2 capture and transport safety can be reckoned with usual practices, CO 2 storage presents a number of specificities that raise as many challenges for verifying safety. It first requires working with unusual timescales: CO 2 needs to be confined in the underground for several centuries or millennia; accordingly, safety must be granted in the long term as well as in the short term. It implies overcoming the human lifetime in the analysis process. A second issue results from the limited knowledge of the underground medium. As extensive as site characterisation can be, the storage complex will still remain incompletely and uncertainly understood. This adds to the fact that CCS involves multiple coupled phenomena, whose study would be challenging even though the system was perfectly established. It can therefore not be compared to industrial facilities, where equipments and processes are precisely described. Moreover, variability between sites restricts, in the case of CO 2 storage, the use of lessons drawn from other locations to assess safety. So far, all these concerns have prevented establishing standards for evaluating safety of CO 2 geological storage sites. The discussions animating the Risk Assessment Network of the International Energy Agency Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme about the requirements for site characterisation or a common risk assessment method [1] , for instance, illustrate this lack of an agreed approach.
The CRISCO2 project aims at providing a simple framework to assess safety for a CO 2 storage project: its purpose is to determine safety criteria, which we define as "requirements to ensure that storage operations have negligible impacts on:
• Human health and safety, • The environment, • Other underground resources, in the short term as well as in the long term". The framework we are developing is not designed to replace a full risk assessment; it is rather thought as a key for a regulating authority to set appropriate precaution measures and/or to audit such a risk assessment. Following the above, safety criteria cannot be established in a generic way and would necessarily have to incorporate site-specific considerations. Therefore, what our work seeks is a methodology for defining safety criteria, rather than the criteria themselves. Nevertheless, in order to check the practice of our approach, our work is supported by an example application. We consider storage in an aquifer in the Paris Basin, and benefit for that from the studies carried out under the PICOREF project [2] .
The CRISCO2 project began in December 2006 and lasts until December 2009. In the following we report the achievements so far about the framework for safety criteria definition, based on risk scenarios and incorporating uncertainty management. We then discuss these results and the additional work plan for the coming year.
Methodological framework for safety criteria definition
The core assumption behind our research is that safety criteria must be based on risk scenarios. For industrial accident or pollution prevention, risk management decisions usually rely on identifying what can go wrong, and what are the consequences if it goes wrong. Similarly, for CO 2 geological storage, safety requirements are to be driven by the potential effects of unexpected behaviours of the storage complex -provided that the foreseen behaviour does not show any negative effects. In that view, a first step consists in establishing the expected normal evolution of the system. The process then implies identifying risk scenarios, i.e. sequences of events leading to the exposure of vulnerable elements to the effects of a hazardous phenomenon. Not only undesired events must be included in the analysis, but also potential targets and their exposure modes. In other words, safety criteria must be proportionate to the vulnerability of the environment; e.g. they will be more stringent in a populated urban area than in a desert.
This approach firstly asks how to determine the relevant scenarios, and then how to exploit them. In a second time, uncertainties must be dealt with during the criteria definition process, since, as said above, they represent one of the major hurdles to safety assessment for CO 2 storage.
Scenario identification
A review of the risk assessment literature for CO 2 storage shows a small number of attempts for identifying risk scenarios. The approaches can broadly be split into two categories:
• The systematic decomposition of the storage complex into Features, Events, Processes (FEPs). This method derived from nuclear waste risk assessment commonly refers to databases. Savage et al. [3] developed such a generic FEP database, available online. Wildenborg et al. [4] extensively studied and documented the use of FEPs to build risk scenarios and created their own database.
• The choice of relevant items among limited sets of risk events. This supposes having predefined generic lists to support the selection. Under the GEODISC project, Bowden and Rigg [5] set up such a method, adapted from industrial risk assessment; it has been applied for several projects in Australia.
We also reviewed literature dedicated to classical industrial risk analysis. Most of the usual approaches seem poorly relevant for transposition to CO 2 storage. One of the major reasons is that they commonly rely on a decomposition of the industrial system into a series of components, each of them being precisely delimited, characterised and assigned a function. A CO 2 storage complex cannot be so systematically divided. The methods found potentially appropriate were similar to the one adapted by Bowden and Rigg.
The major strength of the FEPs approaches comes from their systematic side, which gives a high level of confidence in comprehensiveness of the results. In counterpart, they imply an intensive, time-consuming process. An attempt to use the FEPs tools in our project was found for this reason not conclusive: aiming at a simple framework, we give priority to an easy use. The drawback is a potential lack of comprehensiveness, but it is not worth endeavouring to have a comprehensive list of scenarios if they cannot be dealt with properly in the following stages of the methodology.
We chose therefore an approach belonging to the second category mentioned above, inspired by the GEODISC method. It implies establishing generic lists to serve an expert panel to identify risk scenarios.
Support lists
Two workshops were arranged to agree on such lists. As a result, eleven risk events were recorded, related to the hazards linked to CO 2 geological storage: toxicity of CO 2 or of contaminants, either injected in the gas stream or mobilised in the underground; geomechanical disruption due to increased pressure in the reservoir. They are divided into five classes: 
Expert panel workshop
The proposed lists are meant to support a screening by a group of experts. Considering the specifics of the studied site, this panel should determine which events are likely to occur and the potential targets endangered in case it happens. Unlike in the GEODISC project, we do not intend to assign any probability, either quantitatively or semi-quantitatively. The experts are asked binary evaluations: for each risk event, does it have to be considered in the assessment or not; in case it has to, for each of the targets, can it be concerned by this event or not. We consider unnecessary to enter into the details of the impact type at this stage.
This kind of workshop constitutes a straightforward way to identify elementary risk scenarios. It must bring together pluridisciplinary competences in a group of persons having certain knowledge of the site. It should ideally count 7 to 10 participants.
For our application to the Paris Basin, an expert workshop was organised. All risk events were found relevant in that context, except for the external stressors: future drilling and natural seismicity.
Exploitation of the risk scenarios
The purpose of our approach is to derive safety criteria from the analysis of the risk scenarios as altered behaviour of the storage complex. The prerequisite consists in knowing its normal evolution, or better say its expected evolution. A reservoir model must be built to simulate this reference scenario. Its results provide the boundary conditions for risk scenarios: inputs for simulating the altered behaviour will be e.g. the pressure field at the basis of the cap rock, the gas saturation value at a point where a well or a fault encounters the reservoir... The outcomes of the risk models deliver an evaluation of their effects on the targets. It is expected that safety requirements can be drawn from this estimation. The various models involved are desired as simple as possible. Our effort so far has focused on developing models for the risk events. Targets exposure has barely been studied yet.
Principles of determination of safety criteria
The results of the expert workshop are a list of credible events and potential targets associated. We do not claim to evaluate risk, in the classical sense of probability x gravity: we recommend a deterministic approach, presuming the happening of the risk events judged relevant. Models are used to assess the effects of the hazardous phenomenon, as a function of a number of parameters. This data should then be crossed with the location of vulnerable elements. If the effects remain below levels leading to critical exposure of the targets, then no safety criteria appear necessary. Otherwise, it must be found which parameters have to be controlled, which additional data is required, which operational settings have to be respected or which uncertainties have to be reduced, in order to avoid that the exposure of vulnerable elements following an undesired event overcomes critical levels.
Risk events models
This process grants a significant role to the modelling of the risk events. However, in the context of the CRISCO2 project, the intent is not to elaborate for each risk complex detailed models, which would be site-specific. The research focuses on more generic models that could easily be adapted to each context. We also desire a simple and time-efficient use. Therefore, we prefer analytical, semi-analytical or simple numerical models (1D, 2D) , where possible. The counterpart may be the lack of accuracy. Conservative values must be preferred in the view of defining safety criteria; but oversimplified models could lead to adopting overconservative sets of values. Our simulations do not claim to predict the impacts of risk events, but only to give indicators for estimating their effects.
As stated in the introduction, our work has been supported by an example application in the Paris Basin. For the reference scenario, two models have been employed: • An analytical model has been derived from works by Nordbotten et al. [6] . It simulates the extension of the CO 2 plume during the injection phase; a larger description is provided by Bellenfant and Guyonnet [7] .
• 2D simulations of the extension during as well as after the injection period have been run using the TOUGH2 code [8] . This model is used to investigate the effects of heterogeneities in the reservoir, as opposed to the analytical model where homogeneous properties are assumed.
As for the risk scenarios, an analytical model has been developed for characterising CO 2 leakage through a well. It considers the rise of CO 2 bubbles along a water column, presumed representative for a deficient well. It delivers the rising time, velocity and flow rate out of the well at any point on the vertical, as a function of the initial CO 2 saturation of water. This model and its results are described in details by Wertz et al. [9] . It intends to treat all items related with well leakage in the risk events list, i.e. leak through an operational, an abandoned or a future well.
Analytical computations of the rise of CO 2 through a porous column have been carried out. They are meant to represent leakage through a fault or through a permeable zone in the cap rock (fifth and sixth risk events in the above list). It is calibrated against simple 1D numerical simulations performed with TOUGH2, though these simulations cannot handle CO 2 phase change from supercritical to gas state. The analytical modelling aims at supplying similar outputs as for well leakage, i.e. rising time as well as flow rate.
Geomechanical cap rock integrity has been studied through a semi-analytical model: a linear formula has been deduced after a limited number of numerical simulations. It is then used to identify the most sensitive parameters in the computation of the effective stress. Abacuses are established determining the maximum sustainable pressure depending on the values of these sensitive properties. Details about this approach and its results in the case of the Paris Basin are provided by Rohmer and Bouc [10] . Cap rock integrity must be guaranteed for avoiding leakage as well as geomechanical disorders.
The models built for the reference scenario can be used for assessing the exceeding of the expected lateral extent. Accumulation of CO 2 into a secondary reservoir and vertical flow modifications are currently under investigation. Earthquake-induced fracturing has not been explored with the view of simplified modelling in the frame of the CRISCO2 project yet, since it was not judged relevant for our application case.
Uncertainty management
One of the caveats for assessing CO 2 storage safety, as underlined in the introduction, is that knowledge of the storage system is largely uncertain. This uncertainty must be taken into account in our framework for safety criteria definition. Actually, using simple, time-efficient models facilitate evaluating uncertainty propagation. In analytical models, uncertainty can be directly propagated. The abacuses drawn for cap rock integrity assessment also give way to a straightforward treatment, since ranges of values for the various properties are figured. Quick numerical models can be run numerous times for completing a Monte-Carlo analysis. An equivalent process for more complex models would on the contrary require considerable computation time.
Data uncertainty about the underground in fact relate to two kinds of issues: • Parameters describing the geological medium vary naturally over the domain; this is stochastic uncertainty; • Data to characterise these parameters is scarce, so that their knowledge is limited; this is epistemic uncertainty.
Classical representation of stochastic parameters as probability functions supposes sufficient knowledge. In the case where enough data is not available, assuming a probability density boils down to introduce subjectivity a priori. The purpose of our task related to uncertainty management in the CRISCO2 project is to avoid such a bias; the correct mathematical form is sought to describe what we really know about each parameter, but not more than we know. In that view, we use a hybrid method described by Guyonnet et al. [11] , integrating tools from fuzzy logic and the theory of possibility, as proposed by Zadeh [12] . The idea is to propagate along the computation chain the true data we have at disposal. The parameters for which sufficient data is available can be translated by probability functions, possibilistic representations are chosen for the other ones. Deciding involves subjectivity; the goal of our approach is to introduce it no sooner than the decision stage. Providing an unbiased view of the confidence about the results of the models allows an informed decision; the responsibility belongs to the decision maker to choose the level of conservatism desired.
Work on that topic in the CRISCO2 project has focused on the normal evolution scenario so far, which allows dealing with the risk of exceeding the expected lateral extent. Uncertainty has been assessed for the analytical model of CO 2 extension in the reservoir. Figure 3 illustrates an upper and a lower estimate of the cumulative probability distribution for the lateral radius of the plume for two injection periods: 20 years (red curves) or 50 years (blue curves). The real distribution curve lies between the optimistic (dash line) and the pessimistic (plain line) view, but cannot be known. It comes to the decision maker to set the cursor between these opinions. This uncertainty approach and the result of its application to this example are described in more details by Bellenfant and Guyonnet [7] . Such a treatment obviously depends on the types of models used. In case uncertainty propagation could not be applied this way, then conservative values would have to be preferred for the determination of safety criteria.
Discussion and further work
The outcomes described above result from an ongoing work. Therefore they are still incomplete. Though we have framed our methodology, a number of points require improvements.
As for scenario identification, the proposed process provides access to the relevant elements to include in the analysis. It does not really teach how to consider combinations of events leading to undesired effects. In other words, it explains how to choose the bricks that constitute scenarios, not how to assemble them. We are currently examining how to identify such accidental sequences. However, in the frame of the CRISCO2 project, it may appear adequate and sufficient to only consider 'simple scenarios' i.e. isolated risk events in order to define safety criteria. Once again, our project aims at determining the most critical scenarios rather than at a comprehensive identification.
Exploiting such scenarios requires completing the models for the various risk events. It also raises question about target exposure. Currently reference levels are available to evaluate human CO 2 exposure; similar values for other targets are lacking. The potential effects of impurities must be compared to thresholds as well. Moreover, assessing targets exposure necessitates modelling their mode of exposure. For instance, leakage models can provide values for gas flow rates, whereas the critical thresholds for humans are expressed in terms of CO 2 atmospheric content. A conversion will therefore have to be made. A particular concern when considering leakage impacts relates to potable water aquifers. No data or workflow are available to date to study impacts of a CO 2 leak -potentially with impurities -on water properties in an aquifer. Answers will have to be brought to these questions to complete the methodology for determining safety requirements.
The framework for uncertainty management relies on strong theoretical bases. However it only addresses parameter uncertainties; care must be taken because model uncertainties are not accounted for in the proposed approach. Work goes on to carry out the uncertainty assessment over all risk events models.
Despite these reservations, and counting with its upcoming improvement, the developed methodology seems to meet its purpose and its requirements, especially in terms of practicability and flexibility from one site to another. In the next stages, criteria will be effectively deduced from the models realised for the example application in the Paris Basin. This practice is indispensable to validate the whole process.
Conclusion
The CRISCO2 project aims at defining safety criteria for CO 2 geological storage. The foundations of a methodology for determining such requirements have been set, and tools have been developed to:
• Identify risk scenarios;
• Represent various risk events;
• Assess uncertainties surrounding the parameters and propagate them along the models.
These tools are meant to constitute a simple framework that can be applied to any site with only minor adaptations. Their development will carry on and the method will be completed in the next months. Their practice on the example case in the Paris Basin will form a test of effective deduction of safety criteria.
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